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ABSTRACT
AIRCRAFT DECONFLICTION RESPONSIBILITY ACROSS EN-ROUTE SECTORS
IN NEXTGEN SEPARATION ASSURANCE
by Christopher D. Cabrall
The subject of the current research is a Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) concept that involves automated separation assurance developed to
enable controllers to provide both safe and efficient air traffic services at much higher
traffic densities than possible today. The study investigated the issue of how
responsibility should be handled between controllers for the resolution of a conflict that is
predicted to occur in a sector other than where it was detected. Two possibilities, a DeConflicting AirPlanes procedure (DCAP) versus a De-Conflicting AirSpace procedure
(DCAS), were examined under human-in-the-loop simulations with scripted aircraft
conflicts. Results showed that the DCAS procedure was preferred and that participants
experienced less verbal coordination and took less time to resolve conflicts. The results,
however, did not reveal significant differences among other plane performance metrics
between DCAP and DCAS. These results indicate that the demands of NextGen
separation assurance might still be met with ownership and coordination procedures (e.g.,
DCAP) similar to today. Reducing verbal coordination requirements, however, and
allowing separation assurance responsibilities to extend more seamlessly across sector
boundaries (e.g., DCAS) would evidently be more acceptable to controllers.
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INTRODUCTION
On an average day, the United States National Airspace System (NAS) sees more
than 87,000 flights traverse its skies; approximately 5,000 planes are aloft at any given
moment (National Air Traffic Controllers Association, 2009). To help visualize this
volume of traffic, Figure 1 shows the number of airborne aircraft at a single point in time
above a geographic area about the same size as the state of Connecticut. Over the course
of 2008 with a commercial fleet of 7,274 airplanes, the NAS enabled approximately
757.4 million passengers (over 2 million per day) as well as over a trillion dollars in
cargo to traverse its 17,017,092 square miles of airspace while consuming approximately
21,240 million gallons of fuel at a peak cost of $3.83 per gallon (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2009a). Simply put, the scope of the NAS spans a sizeable number of
planes, miles, and money not to mention the nearly invaluable cost of human life (e.g.,
$6.0 million per person, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 2009).
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Figure 1. Sample of current day United States air traffic volume per en-route sector.

With such a significant investment, the Federal Airspace Administration (FAA)
employs a vast network of more than 15,000 air traffic controllers (ATCo) devoted to its
support and function. Across the U.S. and its territories, controllers staff a wide range of
positions within 478 different facilities (NATCA, 2009). Despite their varied job duties
or position titles, the underlying and fundamental mission statement of all these men and
women is to accomplish the safe and efficient flow of traffic from origin to destination
(Nolan, 2004).
Background
Unfortunately, such high responsibilities weigh on human beings and
compensations such as higher wages, shorter work weeks, and better retirement benefits
2

contrast against limited federal budgets. In a landmark labor-management standoff in the
early 1980s, nearly 75% of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) walked off the job in hopes of gaining recognition and recompense for the
highly stressful nature of their critical work. Such an action was in violation of federal
no-strike clauses, and despite developing trends in other federal strikes (i.e., postal
workers, government printing office, and library of congress employees) President
Reagan fired over 11,000 air traffic controllers who went on strike. Normally graduating
1,500 persons per six month cycle, the FAA’s Oklahoma City training school planned to
ramp their matriculation rate to 5,500 with 45,000 people applying to the school within a
month of the strike’s onset (Manning, 2000). Such staffing decisions have long-term
repercussions especially in a field with a mandatory retirement age of 56 years old. As a
result, the mass hiring in the eighties jeopardized the turn-of-the-millennium ATCo
workforce since a large proportion of employees are eligible for retirement between the
years 2002 and 2012 (Nolan, 2004).
Purpose
With the looming pressures of fewer controllers available to handle increasing
numbers of air traffic, and after several years of particularly disruptive service, the FAA
established an Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) in 2001 as a roadway to redesign
the NAS and implement a benchmark 30% increase in its capacity by 2013 (FAA, 2007).
Meanwhile, forecasts since have estimated demands as high as 1 billion
passengers between 2012 and 2015 with that number more than doubling by 2025
(Mohler, 2008). More conservative estimates foresee 1.1 billion passengers for 2025
3

(FAA, 2009a), representing a 50% increase from today. Furthermore, the OEP projects
that without improvements to the air traffic system, delays will increase 62% by 2014,
with a 27% increase in domestic traffic slated for 2016. Presently, the OEP has found
that thirteen of the 35 busiest airports they have investigated are already operating at
capacity and that a failure to accommodate an increase in demand could have severe
economic impacts (Mohler, 2007). Most alarmingly, the OEP references studies that
have shown that controllers cannot handle even a 25% increase in traffic in their busiest
sectors with the use of today’s tools alone (Mohler, 2008).
For the health of both the U.S. economy and the NAS alike, it is important to
consider the impacts this challenge of demand poses towards controllers meeting their
goals of safe and efficient flow of air traffic.
Safety
Historically, the United States NAS has been well-known for its robust level of
safety. Since its inception in 1959, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
simultaneously exponentially decreased the number of accidents (fatal or otherwise)
while steadily increasing its numbers of flown aircraft (see Fig. 2). Thirty years ago fatal
accidents on commercial jetliners occurred approximately once in every 140 million
miles flown, while today 1.4 billion miles are flown for every fatal accident (i.e., a tenfold improvement in safety). Compared to other forms of transportation in the year 2000,
commercial aviation had 163 fatalities while highways posted 41,800, boats 801, railways
770, and bicycles 738 fatalities. It has been reported that fewer people have died in
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commercial airplane accidents in the U.S. over the past 60 years than are killed in auto
accidents in a typical three-month period (Boeing, 2009).

Figure 2. Safety and growth of NAS.

As others have put it, a person could board an aircraft each day for 36,000 years before
being involved in a fatal accident (Barnett, 2001).
Reasons for air travel’s uniquely high caliber of safety no doubt include the
extensive amount of research and effort put in by manufacturers, pilots, civil aviation
associations, government agencies, and regulatory authorities. In other words, such
safety does not just happen, but rather is designed to be that way. An immense set of
strict policies and procedures have been previously defined for air traffic control
operations, an example of which is the 600+ paged 7110.65 publication document
commonly regarded as the “ATC Bible” (FAA, 2008a). With demand forecasts
indicating greater than normal strains on the NAS in the near future, it becomes all the
5

more pertinent to research system design decisions, and to revisit and revise that Bible in
light of the new tools and technologies that will be necessary if controllers are to be able
to accommodate the additional traffic.
Efficiency
Another problem perhaps more commonly and publically recognized within air
travel than that of safety, is the issue of efficiency. At the turn of the new millennium the
FAA faced historic delays and disruptions to its air transportation services. In the year
2000, about 3.5 of every 100 scheduled flights were cancelled and of those remaining,
nearly a quarter were delayed (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2009). Hordes of
stranded passengers frequented news television programs alongside statistics reporting
alarming levels of increases in delays and cancellations over the previous years. Amid a
season of hearings, panels, and public statements about the delay problem, Monte Belger,
the acting deputy administrator of the FAA, stated on PBS that he felt the entire air
transportation system was in a sort of crisis with the increases in demand surpassing the
capacity of its airports (MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, 2000).
While most obvious to consumers at airports, these problems are not exclusive to
the terminal environment. Delay is also a pertinent an issue for aircraft in between
airports, as they follow the majority of their planned routes at altitude and level flight.
Complimentary with research aimed to address capacity problems at airports, the present
research is oriented around capacity problems of airspace. Interestingly, this issue is not
most directly related to constraints in physical capacity (i.e., there is plenty of room for
many more aircraft in the sky). Instead, the bottleneck for meeting forecasted levels of
6

demands for airspace has been identified to be the mental resources of the human
controllers operating the system. Capacities in human cognition (e.g., memory, attention,
decision-making, etc.) are the principle limiting factor to future levels of traffic, because
people are naturally constrained by a fixed amount of information/objects that they are
able to process at a given time. For this reason, the FAA uses a number known as the
Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) that establishes a trigger value to provide notification
that efficiency may be degraded during specific periods of time for a specific area (FAA,
2008b). Current operating procedures set the MAP value at around 15 - 18 aircraft per
controller. It is easy to see how tripling or even doubling this number over the next 15
years could bog down the system without taking the precautions to research useful tools
and procedures to supplement a controller’s taxed mental resources.
In sum, to meet increases in demand, research is needed to design and implement
the tools and operating methods to enable today’s controller to meet the challenges of
tomorrow and continue to uphold their golden rule of ensuring safe and efficient air
travel.

NextGen
In 2003, Congress enacted the Vision 100 – Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act (Public Law 108-176) and established the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO) to manage work related to the wide-ranging transformation of the US NAS into
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Consisting of members from
the FAA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Transportation (DOT),
7

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of
Commerce (DOC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, the JPDO was made responsible for supervising and
coordinating the national vision statement for an air system capable of meeting potential
air traffic demand by 2025 through a multiagency research and development effort. One
output of that effort is the continual development of a Concept of Operations (ConOps)
document that identifies key research and policy issues for NextGen (Joint Planning and
Development Office, 2009).
Amid the diversity of ideas and initiatives within the ConOps, one underlying
characterization JPDO uses to describe NextGen is the utilization of optimized aircraft
trajectories. Essentially with advanced computational support, aircraft will be able to
identify and adhere to trajectories that simultaneously meet the safety, comfort, schedule,
efficiency, and environmental impact requirements of the user and the system. While
flying along their optimal routes however, aircraft still need to be kept at safe distances
from one another and as much as the challenge exists for a controller to find a conflictfree route, another challenge is to find the best conflict-free route (e.g., move aircraft the
least from their pre-determined routes) to achieve that safety. The focus of the current
research is a NextGen concept of separation management within the high altitude (at or
above 29,000 feet) en-route environment.
Separation Assurance
The NAS is divided into 21 different en route Air Route Traffic Control Centers
(ARTCC) that cover the Continental U.S. Each ARTCC’s area of responsibility, which
8

average more than 100,000 square miles and generally extend over a number of states, is
further sub-divided into two to seven different sectors (FAA, 2009b). Each sector is
staffed by at least one on radar position (“R-side”) ATCo who takes active control over
each aircraft in his/her sector and issues clearances to pilots to keep their aircraft separate
from other traffic, expedite traffic flows, and provide additional services as available.
Being actively involved with each individual aircraft, today’s controllers are responsible
for both the manual detection and manual resolution of any potential losses of separation
(LoS, i.e., two aircraft passing each other in the en-route environment within a distance
that is less than five nautical miles laterally and 1000 feet vertically). As a two-step
process, a controller first projects along the flight plan of each of his/her aircraft to
identify or “detect” a predicted LoS (i.e., a “conflict”) and then decides upon and
executes a clearance to an aircraft to remove and “resolve” that conflict.
However, this manual process can only be performed for a very limited number of
aircraft (i.e., a sector’s MAP value) and as the number of aircraft increases, conflicts
become harder to discriminate and the solution space becomes more limited (see Fig 3).
Traffic levels at twice (2x) and three times (3x) the present day levels cannot be managed
with conventional manual air traffic control separation assurance techniques (Prevot,
Homola, & Mercer, 2008).
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Figure 3. Current day controller display with 1x, 2x, and 3x traffic levels.

Automated Separation Assurance
For these reasons, research is being conducted with the intended application of
helping to overcome or supplement previously mentioned human limitations in separation
management. While promising airborne approaches are investigated and developed
elsewhere (Barhydt and Kopardekar, 2005), the present study contributes to that
regarding a ground-based automated separation assurance focus (Erzberger, 2006; Farley
and Erzberger, 2007; Erzberger and Heere, 2008; Homola, 2008; McNally and
Thipphavong, 2008; Prevot, Homola, Mercer, Mainini, & Cabrall, 2009; Erzberger,
Lauderdale, & Chu, 2010; Prevot et al., 2010; Wing et al., 2010). For NextGen,
automated separation assurance is envisioned to include both computerized conflict
detection and resolution algorithms. Conflict detection automation can scan for and then
flag predicted conflicts to a controller. Conflict resolution automation can aid a
controller in the identification, representation, and transmission of a conflict-free
10

trajectory to the aircraft in conflict. Such algorithms function through iterative loops that
take the flight data from the conflicting aircraft, the surrounding traffic, as well as
information about other hazards and constraints as input to compute, prioritize,
recommend, and/or select preferred resolution trajectories and maneuvers.
With such layers of automation in operation, a controller would be able to resolve
a conflict by requesting an optimal resolution trajectory from the automation and/or
perform what are called trial plans via click and drag operations on a provisional
trajectory that the automation continuously probes for conflicts. One other principle
feature of automated separation assurance would be a component for the transmission of
resolution trajectories (route changes, altitude clearances, descent speed profiles, etc.) to
an aircraft’s flight management system (FMS) via datalink rather than through verbal
clearances alone.
Automated separation assurance poses significant challenges before its benefits
can be actualized, and the human factors issues associated with the controller’s changed
work environment must be given careful attention. Up until and including recent
advances, controllers have primarily operated under a protocol of ownership-oriented
procedures characterized by protecting aircraft within specific sectors of airspace. With
technological advancements (i.e., integrated automated conflict detection), however and
the adoption of more trajectory-oriented procedures, controllers will be increasingly
encouraged to work cooperatively across sector boundaries for well-planned, nominally
conflict-free flows of traffic (Leiden & Green, 2000). To achieve NextGen en-route
separation assurance (SA) benefits, the provision of new decision support tool
11

technologies alone will presumably not be enough to enable the transition to strategic
planning if a controller’s mindset, procedures, and responsibilities are not likewise
updated from a tactical environment.
Automated conflict detection entails a problem of inter-sector boundary event
responsibility (compared to manual intra-sector jurisdiction) by nature of an automated
probe’s ability to see and alert to conflicts that will occur across a sector border and
hence beyond traditional boundaries. For example, referencing Figure 4, in a preconflict probe environment the “ATCo 1” is primarily responsible for aircraft entering
and flying within sector 1, and ensuring that no conflicts occur between these aircraft
(smaller aircraft in Figure 4). With advanced strategic conflict probing and alerting, it
becomes possible for “ATCo 1” to be alerted to a conflict that would occur in the sector
of “ATCo 2”, which he/she might otherwise not have been able to see or be concerned
with (aircraft A and aircraft B in Figure 4). Furthermore, in many situations overhead
coordination costs can exist whenever the resolution planning ATCo is not the same as
the resolution implementing ATCo.

12

Figure 4. Involvement of controllers of adjacent sectors.

Motivations
The procedures and technologies examined in the present study depart from
current day procedures in a number of important ways. First, the technologies are
different. The current study examined automation-assisted conflict detection and
resolution implementations via an interactive interface directly integrated within an Rside’s primary display (DSR). With such layers of automation in operation, the R-side
controller was able to resolve a conflict by requesting an optimal resolution trajectory
from the automation and/or performing trial plan routes via click and drag operations, to
identify a provisional trajectory that the automation continuously probed for conflicts
(Prevot et al., 2009). Second, the responsibilities are different. Current day operations
13

require that the responsibility for conflict detection resides with the controller and not the
automation. In the present study this responsibility was shifted to the automation. This
radical paradigm shift results in a complete redesign of procedures, controller
workstations, and human/automation interaction philosophy. Third, the air ground
communication mechanisms are different. Present day operational prototypes allow for a
great reduction of verbal coordination between controllers through the use of digital
transmission/reception of inter-sector coordinated trial plans among controllers. The
current study also extended this capability to include aircraft as well. This assumed
component allowed for the transmission of resolution trajectories (route changes, altitude
clearances, descent speed profiles, etc.) to an aircraft’s flight management system via
datalink rather than verbal clearances alone.
Last, prior research has not yet evaluated inter-sector coordination issues in a
highly automated NextGen environment. Single sector studies have shown general
benefits (e.g., Prevot et al., 2010), but left out the coordination issues associated with
automating conflict detection and resolution in high density traffic environments.
Therefore, this study examined critical operational issues that need to be considered
before an informed determination of the feasibility and effectiveness of highly automated
air traffic control operations can be made.
Current Study
The illustrated conflict between aircraft A and aircraft B in Figure 4 could be
alerted (via advanced automation detection algorithms) to different controllers depending
on different procedural responsibilities. A basic question arises then as to who of these
14

controllers should be responsible for the deconfliction of such an alert (i.e., both
resolution planning and implementation). The current study addressed this issue of
deconfliction responsibility for en-route controllers working within an automated
separation assurance environment. Of the many different combinations where multiple
aircraft could be conflicting across multiple sector boundaries, a simple dichotomy
between adjacent sectors was established first to explore the differences between two
general operational procedures. Note that in either procedure both ground-ground and
air-ground data communications technology was assumed that enabled controllers to
coordinate with one another and with airplanes directly through the digital
transmission/reception of trajectory clearances.
In the DeConflicting AirPlanes (DCAP) procedure, resolution responsibility is
tied to the ATCo(s) of the sector(s) where aircraft are located at the time the conflict is
detected and made into an alert; hence ATCo focus is on protecting their set of owned
airplanes from conflicts. Under DCAP, the automation alerts an ATCo whenever any of
his/her currently owned airplanes are predicted to lose separation minima (regardless of
where that LoS will occur). Referring again to Figure 1, in DCAP, “ATCo 1” is
responsible for maintaining a conflict free trajectory for airplane A and “ATCo 4” for
airplane B, with any necessary coordination to determine which or both aircraft need to
be issued a clearance.
In the DeConflicting AirSpace (DCAS) procedure, resolution responsibility is tied
to the ATCo of the sector where the potential LoS is predicted to occur; hence the ATCo
focus is on deconflicting an area of airspace. Under DCAS, the automation alerts the
15

ATCo of any conflicts that result in a LoS within their individual airspace of
responsibility (regardless of airplanes’ current location). In DCAS in Figure 1, “ATCo
2” is solely responsible for deconflicting alerts to LoS in his/her airspace and so would
issue a conflict-probed clearance to airplanes A and/or B even while they are currently
flying through sectors 1 and/or 4 (with optional ATCo-ATCo coordination).
As a second factor, two different future levels of traffic densities were chosen to
represent the environment under which these operating procedures could take place
because there are differences in the amount of traffic forecasted for the future NAS - up
to three times present day traffic levels - and also because any increase will occur over
time rather than immediately (JPDO, 2009). The different traffic density levels used here
assumed a baseline Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) value of about 18 aircraft per sector
as a baseline, and represented levels of 1.7x and 2.5x traffic, or about 30 or 45 planes
respectively per sector.
Coordination in Aviation Decision Making
Because one of the largest underlying differences between the DCAP and DCAS
procedures is the number of controllers involved for a conflict, between controller
coordination and effective team dynamics was of principle interest to the current study.
Previous research from the Crew Resource Management (CRM) framework provides a
promising context for anticipating how the between controller interactions would play
out. As developments in 1950’s aircraft technology enhanced and stabilized airframe and
engine reliably, attention shifted to other sources of aviation risk and “pilot error” grew to
be identified as the largest contributor. As a reaction to a growing recognition that these
16

“pilot errors” were primarily reflective of failures in team communication and
coordination rather than deficiencies in individual skills, e.g., “stick –and-rudder
proficiency” (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980; Murphy, 1980), CRM emerged as a
convergence of concepts, attitudes, and practical approaches for achieving effective
human performance in a team context. Moving away from the aviation domain’s
traditional individualistic emphasis on pilot performance, CRM underscored the
importance of task delegation, situation awareness, leadership, use of available resources
including other crewmembers, interpersonal communications, and the process of building
and maintaining an effective team relationship on the flightdeck (Helmreich & Foushee,
2010). Initially CRM denoted “Cockpit Resource Management,” but because its
principles generalized so well to areas outside of the cockpit, it was re-dubbed “Crew
Resource Management” to reflect its application to team dynamics in general.
A plausible assumption to make from CRM is that agreement between team
members’ shared mental models would better enable teams to achieve their goals
(Orasanu, 2010) and that these shared mental models should increase with the extent of
communication and collaboration (Payne, 2008). However, in a study with pilot dyad
teams performing missions in a PC-based flight simulator, Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin,
Salas, and Cannon-Bowers (2000) found that, contrary to their hypothesis, convergence
of mental models did not increase over time in spite of increased amounts of
coordination; instead it was stable within their dyads. In reviewing the former as well as
other studies on shared mental models, Payne (2008) posits that there must be team
situations in which role differentiation is critical for success, suggesting that task mental
17

models should not so much be “shared” as “distributed” to allow for effective team
performance. What becomes most important in such situations then is not the specifics of
shared task knowledge but that individuals’ knowledge about who knows what is
accurate. In other words, it may not be necessary for team members to both know the
same thing (e.g., what the other is thinking or doing) but that a team member can trust
that another has the requisite information or knowledge that makes his or her actions
appropriate. Orasanu (2010) notably points out that the intent of communication training
in CRM is not simply to get crews to talk more. Because high levels of talk contribute to
workload, instead what is desired is the definition of the problem, plans, strategies, and
relevant information, i.e., the context of the problem needs to be considered.
Illustratively, Orasanu (2010) charts an aviation decision process model that
begins with a threat or problem event and progresses in accordance with the conditions of
the context to result in one of four different courses of action for the decision maker:
“apply rule,” “choose option,” “create novel solution,” or “gather more information.”
The contexts of the first two courses of action involve problems that are familiar and/or
have readily available condition-action rules, whereas the contexts of the last two involve
problems that are either not understood or where no options are available. Anecdotally, it
is not hard to imagine how contexts that call for the last two courses of action could be
facilitated by the involvement of another person, whereas those of the first could be
hindered by unnecessary coordination, i.e., when standard operating procedures can be
applied.
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Looking at the experimental tasks of the present study, the controller participants
would be expected to regard the scripted conflict problems as familiar and with multiple
condition-action rules available (as they were to be detected by the automation with
sufficient time ahead of a LoS). From their professional training and years of experience
of “working traffic,” they assumedly have internalized a vast array of mappings between
aircraft-aircraft conflict orientations and respective solutions. Furthermore, the level of
automation assumed in the experimental concept is such that conflict-free resolutions
were available to be automatically generated and displayed on-demand to the controller at
any point in time. With an assumed rate of approximately one conflict per minute (based
on the simulated levels of traffic complexity) and an a priori trust in the automation
functions, it was expected that less coordination could actually serve the controllers better
in resolving their sector-boundary spanning conflicts because they could trust that
movements of aircraft made by other controllers were all being continuously probed and
cleared of conflicts before being implemented.
Research Questions and General Hypotheses
The primary research question of interest was which deconfliction responsibility
procedure, DCAP or DCAS, would better enable a NextGen ATCo to perform his/her
separation assurance duties. These two operational procedures were explored across two
different levels of traffic densities forecasted for NextGen. The DCAS procedure limits
the number of responsible controllers for conflict detection and resolution to just one
person in all conflict cases and so reduces the potential ambiguity of responsibility.
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Thus, it was hypothesized that the DCAS would prove to be a better standard operating
procedure in the automated separation assurance environment than DCAP, both in terms
of controller experience and plane performance.
Under similar levels of ATC automation and technology in prior research, where
responsibility procedures for inter-sector conflicts were at the time unspecified but
consistent with those outlined by DCAP (Homola, 2008), results showed tolerable levels
of separation violations, delay, and workload at the lowest density of about 30 aircraft per
controller. However, there were increases in these areas as the number of aircraft per
controller increased to about 60. As an additional hypothesis for the current study, it was
predicted that controllers would be able to satisfactorily meet their duties under either
procedure in the lower traffic density of about 30 aircraft per controller but would exhibit
degradation with the DCAP procedure as the density was increased to about 45 aircraft
per controller. In other words, an interaction effect was hypothesized between traffic
density and procedure such that DCAS would be effective under either traffic density
(1.7x or 2.5x) but that DCAP would only be effective under the 1.7x density.
Specific Hypotheses –DCAS “better” than DCAP
A range of hypotheses were considered to account for various outcomes of
operation under the two different procedures and included aspects of coordination, time
on task, workload, preference, feasibility, efficiency, and safety.
Coordination. Controllers would voluntarily coordinate more with each other in
DCAP than in DCAS both in the number and length of ATCo to ATCo transmissions.
Furthermore, they would be cognizant of this difference in amount of coordination
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between the procedures both for themselves and in the amounts they expected future
controllers to engage in.
Time on Task. Controllers would solve the scripted conflicts faster in the DCAS
procedure than in the DCAP procedure.
Workload. Controller workload would be less in the DCAS procedure than in
the DCAP procedure, both in terms of their self-reported workload ratings as well as
those assessed by the supervisor position.
Preference. Controller preference ratings would indicate greater preference for
the amounts of coordination they experienced under the DCAS procedure versus the
amount of coordination they experienced under the DCAP procedure. Furthermore, the
participants would anticipate that future NextGen controllers would also prefer the DCAS
procedure coordination levels more than the DCAP procedure coordination levels.
Feasibility. Controllers would judge the DCAS procedure to be more feasible
than the DCAP procedure.
Efficiency. Controller concern for the in-efficient movement of planes would be
greater in the DCAP procedure than in the DCAS procedure. More resolution attempts
would be made for a given scripted conflict under the DCAP procedure than under the
DCAS procedure. Heading change clearances issued to resolve conflicts for planes in
DCAP would be larger than those in DCAS.
Safety. Planes would be kept more safely apart in the DCAS procedure than in
the DCAP procedure showing fewer Losses of Separation overall, as well as fewer
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Operational Errors and Proximity Events. Additionally, the time remaining until
predicted Loss of Separation would be lower in DCAP than in DCAS.
Specific Hypotheses – Interaction of procedure and traffic level
Traffic Level 1.7x. Controllers will show acceptable levels of coordination, time
on task, workload, preference, feasibility, efficiency, and safety for both the DCAP and
DCAS procedures under the 1.7x traffic density conditions.
Traffic Level 2.5x. Controllers will show acceptable levels of coordination, time
on task, workload, preference, feasibility, efficiency and safety for the DCAS procedure
under the 2.5x traffic density conditions, but these levels would be negatively elevated
for the DCAP procedure.
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METHOD
Design
The current study employed a 2 x 2 within-subjects design with operational
method (DCAP, DCAS) and traffic level (1.7x, 2.5x) as independent variables.
Operational method contrasted two different possibilities for controller responsibility for
conflict resolution and traffic level contrasted two different forecasted airspace traffic
densities as multiples of present day traffic levels. All experimental data were collected
from Human-in-the-Loop simulations conducted with the Multi Aircraft Control System
(MACS) simulation platform within the Airspace Operations Laboratory (AOL) at NASA
Ames Research Center (Airspace Operations Laboratory, 2008, Prevot et al., 2010). All
scripted conflicts were presented in two independent but equivalent “Worlds” with teams
of four sector controllers and one supervisor running simultaneously in each World. Data
was collected from participants across eight 15 minute runs. Each trial was run under
either DCAP or DCAS, consisted of either a 1.7x or 2.5x traffic density, and included a
minimum of three pre-scripted conflicts per R-ride ATCo (see Fig. 5). All ATCo
positions were staffed by a local cadre of recently retired controllers who had both
extensive experience in air traffic control with the R-Side position and with the Multi
Aircraft Control System NextGen prototype software; thus representing a sample that
would have the appropriate skills for the simulated environment and experimental
concept.
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Figure 5. Experimental design test matrix.
Operational method levels were distributed between Worlds evenly such that per
participant, half of the trials were conducted under the DCAP procedure with the other
half conducted under the DCAS procedure. Likewise, half of all the trials for a
participant were run with 1.7x traffic and the other half were run with 2.5x traffic.
Learning or carry-over ordering effects were controlled for by devoting a full half day to
training in which the participants received ample exposure and experience with each
manipulated factor level. Furthermore in this vein, counter-balancing was applied where
feasible. Across the eight runs, each of the eight experimental R-side ATCo participants
was presented with at least 24 conflicts resulting in a total of 192 scripted conflicts
available for analyses between the two different factors. Lastly, each participant was
given 15 minute breaks in between runs and 45 minutes for lunch. In all, approximately
1.5 days of participation was required of each controller.
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As a starting point for looking at adjacent sector resolution responsibility, three
of the four basic conflict cases (see Fig. 6) used in the qualitative evaluation of various
conflict and flow rate conformance concepts in the Leiden and Green (2000) research
were operationally examined in the current study. Case A, the intra-sector case, was left
out because the DCAP and DCAS responsible controller would be the same person.
However, cases B – External, C – External Intruder, and D – Inter-sector needed to be
purposefully represented in the traffic to span the differences in the number of controllers
and sectors involved.

Figure 6. Cases differening by number of controllers (sectors) involved.
Conflicts were pre-scripted into the traffic scenarios to represent the three conflict
cases of interest as well as a realistic proportion of conflict geometries between aircraft at
level, climb/descent, or overtaking, generally representative of today’s numbers of these
geometries. In all experimental conditions, controllers performed routine separation tasks
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with the aid of automated conflict detection and resolution. This level of automation
included manual conflict resolution with a highly responsive trial planning tool that was
integrated with data link, the conflict detection function, and an interactive auto-resolver
that was available for the R-side to use. The controllers were able to use the autoresolver to request a conflict resolution trajectory and uplink it unchanged, modify the
resolution trajectory using the trial planner and then uplink it, or cancel the modification.
Participants
After receipt of the proper approvals (Appendix A), a total of 14 ATC positions
(eight R-sides, two supervisors, four confederates) and eight aircraft simulation stations
were staffed in the study. Aircraft in the simulation were largely automated and operated
by a mix of general aviation pilots and aviation students. All ATC positions were
operated by a local cadre of recently retired controllers. These men and women were
aged between 45 and 65 and had extensive experience in air traffic control (on the R-Side
position). Furthermore, from their participation in prior simulation studies with MACS
(Multi Aircraft Control System), their familiarity with the software usage and automation
prototype environment was key. Participants that met the above requirements needed
little training on the non-experimental portions of the software they encountered in the
present study because they had all interacted with it before. Without this knowledge, an
extensive amount of training would be needed, requiring more time and financial
resources. As this type of person has demonstrated exceptional skills when working the
en route display with and without various levels of automation, the external validity of
the present study relied heavily on the experiences of this particular participant set.
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Experimental Environment
The participants were tested in a room that resembles the dark rooms of an
ARTCC, with several DSR workstations situated next to each other (see Fig. 7).

Figure 7. Staffed R-side positions.
The airspace used for the simulations was modeled after four adjacent en route sectors:
sectors 98 and 90 of the Kansas City ARTCC (ZKC) and sectors 80 and 91 of the
Indianapolis ARTCC (ZID). The traffic through the test sectors used in the scenarios
averaged a present day and locally representative mixture of approximately 65%
overflights and 35% transitioning aircraft between the altitudes of 18,000 and 45,000
feet. The four sectors are shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Test airspace.

Apparatus
The AOL equipment was set up to replicate the equipment used in the FAA’s
ARTCCs and used the MACS JAVA software as its primary simulation platform. Each
workstation consisted of: Dell Precision PC, model T7400, Vista Ultimate (SP1), Intel®
Xeon® CPU – X5482 @ 3.20GHz (2), 8GB RAM, 64bit system; Cortron, Inc. Keyboard,
model 109-50008C; Measurement Systems, Inc. Trackball, PN XCL250-1; Dell mouse,
model MOA8BO; Barco ISIS (MDP-471) display; Toshiba Portege M700 Tablet PC;
Plantronics headset; Delcom Products food pedal, model 803653. Eight identically
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configured workstations were used for the eight R-side test participants. Further details
on the emulation and experimental implementation can be found in AOL (2008) and
Prevot et al. (2010). Lastly, TechSmith Camtasia screen capture software recorded video
files of all visible screen events while audio recording software captured all voice activity
on a VSCS communication systems emulation.
Procedure
After reading, agreeing with and signing the consent form (Appendix B), all 14
ATCo participants were briefed together on the purpose of the study. Each of the two
different operating procedures (DCAP vs. DCAS) were introduced and explained at
length. It was made clear that during the DCAP procedure, their conflict list table and
display would highlight aircraft conflict pairs whenever at least one of those aircraft was
under their track control ownership. Conversely, in the DCAS procedure it was
explained that table alerts and highlighting would occur only when the point at which the
aircraft were predicted to conflict resided within their individual sector of airspace.
Additionally, it was emphasized that under the DCAS procedure, each ATCo would
exclusively be shown conflicts that no one else was being shown; whereas in the DCAP
procedure another ATCo might be shown the same conflict depending on the specific
geometries and ownership states. In regards to resolution procedures, it was instructed
that they should strive to adhere as closely possible to present day standards and methods
with the exception that they were provided data-link channels for communicating aircraft
trajectories both between ATCo and planes, as well as ATCo and ATCo. Finally, it was
also explained that under the DCAP procedure an ATCo could only send trajectory
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amendments without coordinating with another ATCo to aircraft within their track
control/ownership whereas in the DCAS procedure this restriction would not exist, and
ATCo could reach beyond the boundaries of their sectors to move aircraft with no
requirement to coordinate this with another ATCo. Coordination responsibilities (when
and how much) then, were generally left up to their own discretion. Participant questions
were solicited and answered until all were comfortable in their understanding of the
differing display characteristics and corresponding responsibilities under each of the
procedures.
Participants were then broken into two teams, each consisting of four R-side
controllers, one supervisor, and two supporting confederate “ghost” roles to handle the
aircraft surrounding the test sectors. Each team was run through eight 15 minute practice
runs (half under DCAP and half under DCAS, switching between the procedures every
other run). Traffic densities were staggered and alternated within these blocks. The
focus and intent of the trial runs was to ensure that the controllers could learn to clearly
distinguish and execute both of the different operating procedures.
Next, participants were run through eight different experimental 15 minute
scenarios with scripted conflicts. During a scenario, controllers were asked to perform all
of their duties as normal but with the addition of using the automated tools to resolve
conflicts. Conflict alerts appeared on their screens in a conflict alert table list, via color
coded highlighting of aircraft and via magenta colored time until LoS counters that
appeared in the first line of a flight’s expanded data block (see Fig 9).
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Figure 9. Conflict table, color coding, and time until LoS counter.
All provisional trajectory amendment trial plans were integrated directly on the
primary radar screen and were continuously probed for conflicts (see Fig. 10). The blue
shaded areas indicate that a conflict is present and exactly where it will occur as the trial
plan trajectory line is moved in real time.
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Figure 10. Trial planning a trajectory amendment.
Metrics
The metrics of the study were chosen to address the overarching goals of ATC,
i.e., the accomplishment of safe and efficient travel. In addition, general usability metrics
were also measured. All objective data were calculated from internal MACS software
output logs, and all subjective data were collected from computerized questionnaires
administered at the end of a run, end of a DCAP/DCAS procedure block, and at the end
of the study (see Appendix C).
Safety metrics included number of LoS as operational errors (O.E.) and proximity
events (P.E.) and minimum time until LoS. Legal separation was defined as it is today in
the en-route environment with a minimum required distance of 5 miles laterally and
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1,000 feet vertically between aircraft. Two types of LoS were categorized in the
simulation according to simulated buffers such that, if aircraft came closer than 4.5 miles
of one another laterally and 800 feet vertically, it was counted as an operational error,
whereas, if aircraft came between 5 and 4.5 miles of one another laterally and under 800
feet vertically, it was counted as a proximity event. Additionally, the time until LoS
counter was recorded to capture how much time remained for a given conflict prediction
before it would become a LoS.
Efficiency metrics included the number of resolutions issued and the sum of
lateral heading changes for scripted conflict aircraft pairs. Participants were also asked to
rate amount of concern for aircraft being moved un-necessarily or counter-productively
both for themselves individually as well as what they anticipated for future ATCo of
NextGen. Last, in regards to both safety and efficiency, ATCo were also asked to rate
the feasibility of either procedure.
General usability metrics included workload ratings, time on task, amount, and
agreeableness of verbal coordination, and agreeableness of the procedures in general.
Workload ratings were collected on a 6-point scale from “Very Low” to “Very High.”
The unlabeled numeric scale was presented at the top of an ATCo display every three
minutes with a corresponding auditory bell, and remained highlighted in yellow until a
response was made by clicking on top of it or through use of dedicated function keys
(i.e., F1 through F6). Through rehearsals with prior simulations, this group of
participants already had mastered the practice of internalizing the values and response
procedure for the particular workload rating scale shown in Appendix D. For each
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scripted conflict pair, time on task was measured as the time taken from the first detection
to the last resolution as the summing of segments represented by each separate attempt
(for the cases where multiple resolutions were sent) rather than as an elapsed total.
Amount of coordination was measured objectively from recorded audio files (in seconds)
as well as subjectively through rating scales (1 to 5). Agreeableness ratings for
coordination and for procedures in general were also measured with 1-to -5 scales.
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RESULTS
All data were examined with a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the
independent variables of procedure (DCAP or DCAS) and traffic density (1.7x or 2.5x);
with the exception of questions from the post-procedure and post-simulation surveys,
which were analyzed via ANOVA with the procedure factor alone. For the few data sets
that violated assumptions underlying an ANOVA, i.e., homogeneity of variance or
normalized distributions, descriptive statistics are compared and reported, and remaining
factors are examined independently. Last, while the subjective data were collected via
Likert-like ordinal scales and thus traditionally in violation of parametric analysis, recent
reviews and research show common use of ANOVA for such data and support its
treatment of such as interval by its underlying nature (Jaccard & Wan, 1996; Homola,
2008; Prevot et al., 2009; Mainini, 2009).
Overview
The results are grouped into two general categories for ease of interpretation:
metrics regarding effects on controllers and metrics regarding effects on planes. Tables 1
and 2 separate the results according to these groupings, identifying their general type and
scale as well as providing their means, standard deviations, and values of statistical
significance.
In general, Table 1 shows that the experiences of the controllers were affected by
the type of procedure (DCAS vs. DCAP). When asked to be responsible for
deconflicting an area of airspace rather than a set of currently owned aircraft, controllers
objectively did not find it necessary to coordinate their inter-sector deconfliction
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clearances with their adjacent sector partner and were faster at resolutions.
Correspondingly, the controller participants subjectively reported lower experienced and
expected levels of future coordination under the DCAS procedure; and rated their
workload there lower and preferences higher than under the DCAP procedure. Results
from metric numerals III-a., IV-a., V-a., V-b., and V-c., were applied to ANOVA,
however the interpretation of the value of statistical significance need be reflected in light
of a lack of variance by the participants in one procedure vs. the other. In the DCAS
procedure, the participants did not coordinate their resolutions across the sector
boundaries and were determinedly sure of this absence and their preference for it.
Procedural significance is more clearly seen, then, in the descriptive statistics of these
data than from inferential analyses derived from comparisons of variance.
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Table 1. Controller experience results.
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Table 2. Plane performance results.

As seen generally in Table 2, however, controllers were able to provide nondifferential service to aircraft no matter the procedure they were operating under.
Objectively, the resolution clearances they sent to planes were not more frequent, of
greater magnitude, nor closer to time of predicted LoS. Instead controllers were able to
keep planes apart equally in either the DCAP or the DCAS procedure. Subjectively, they
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also expressed similar opinions as to any concern for counter-productive or unnecessary
movement of planes between the procedures and did not rate one procedure as ultimately
more feasible than the other.
In regards to the traffic density manipulation, only the workload metrics showed
significant differences. Seemingly evident differences in the number of separation
violations between the 1.7x ( 0 ) and 2.5x ( 2 ) traffic densities were not pursued as both
were investigated and determined to be in violation of conceptual assumptions (discussed
further in the LoS sub-section).
Table 3 displays the sub-group means, standard deviations, and interaction
statistics for the metrics that are meaningful in interpreting the traffic density and
procedure interaction hypothesis regarding acceptability and performance for both
procedures under either traffic density. In general, under the 1.7x traffic density
conditions, averages appear on the more desirable lower half of subjective rating scales
and within tolerable objective limits in terms of minutes to LoS, counts of resolution
attempts, and degrees of heading change. Furthermore, the sub-group values of DCAS
under the 2.5x density conditions do not appear to dramatically depart from those for
either procedure in the 1.7x conditions. While the subjective ratings of DCAP within the
2.5x traffic density consistently ranked further to the negative aspect end of the scales
than any other sub-group, it should be noted that no significant interactions were obtained
between the procedure and traffic density factors on any measured data.
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Table 3. Sub-group means, standard deviations, and interaction significance statistics.
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I. Likability of procedure. At the end of the last day of the simulation study,
participants were asked in their questionnaires to identify their preferences for the two
procedures they experienced as well as their reasons behind their ratings (Appendix C,
Post-Study Questionnaire). Rather than potentially leading participant response by only
asking participants to indicate which procedure they liked better in a forced choice
format, by design, two different ratings were elicited independently for each procedure,
allowing for the unique outcome that they might hate both or love both.
The likability of procedure was rated on a 1 to 5 scale (Hate it (1) – Love it (5))
for both procedures [DCAP (M = 3.20, SD = 1.03), DCAS (M = 1.30, SD = 0.48)].
While the controller participants on average responded only slightly on the dislike side of
the scale for the DCAP procedure, they responded much more consistently on the “loved
it” extremity for the DCAS procedure. The analyses showed a significant effect of the
manipulation of procedure on expressed likability preference [F(1,18) = 27.77, p < .001],
such that the DCAS procedure was given more favorable preference ratings than the
DCAP procedure. Frequency distributions of rating responses for preference can be seen
in Figure 11 and the significant mean comparison in Figure 12.

Figure 11. Likability of procedure rating distributions.
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Figure 12. Likability of procedure significant mean comparison.
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II-a. Workload (self – report). Throughout each 15 minute run, workload
prompts appeared every three minutes in the margin at the top of controller participants’
primary display and lasted for forty seconds for each prompt. The participants tested had
been previously highly exposed to the prompt and practiced at responding with their
answers (Appendix D), and in this simulation there were 304 workload responses to 320
prompts, indicative of a 96.2% response rate. The 3.8% omission rate was not directly
associable with any systematic imbalance, but instead appeared to be spread in an
apparently random distribution between participants and conditions.
Workload ratings were made on a 1 to 6 scale ((Very Low (1) – Very High (6))
with averages computed per each controller for each run While average ratings for all
manipulations fell below the halfway point on the workload scale, ratings associated with
the DCAS procedure were the lowest. The analyses showed a significantly lower average
workload rating in the DCAS procedure (M = 1.65, SD = 0.83) than the DCAP procedure
(M = 2.45, SD = 1.23), [F(1,300) = 45.35, p <.001], as well as a lower workload average
in the 1.7x traffic density (M = 1.93, SD = 1.02) than in the 2.5x traffic density (M =
2.16, SD = 1.20), [F(1,300) = 4.52, p < .05]. No significant interaction between
procedure and traffic level was found for controller self-reported workload [F(1,300) =
2.37, p = .125]. Average workload response ratings per timed prompt for procedure and
traffic density can be seen in Figures 13 and 14, with significant mean comparisons in
Figures 15 and 16.
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Figure 13. Average workload self-response ratings by prompt time and procedure.

Figure 14. Average workload self-response ratings by prompt time and traffic density.
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Figure 15. Workload self-response significant mean procedure comparison.

Figure 16. Workload self-response significant mean density comparison.
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II-b. Workload (supervisor assessment). Two participant controllers staffed a
supervisor position for each of the two different sets of four radar controller positions and
were asked to provide a single workload rating for each R-side representing their average
workload for the entirety of the just completed run. These ratings were made on the same
1 to 6 scale ((Very Low (1) - Very High (6)) as the R-side self-reported workload ratings.
Figure 17 shows that the supervisors gave higher frequencies of ratings at the
lower end of the workload scale (i.e., 1 to 2) for the DCAS procedure compared to the
DCAP procedure, as well as lower frequencies for DCAS compared to DCAP for mid to
high workload ratings.

Figure 17. Supervisor assessed R-side workload ratings by procedure.
As with the self-reported workload ratings, the analyses showed the supervisors to
have assessed their controllers to have significantly less workload in the DCAS procedure
(M = 2.20, SD = .72) than in the DCAP procedure (M = 3.28, SD = 1.22), [F(1,76) =
31.02, p = .000] as well as less in the 1.7x traffic density (M = 2.35, SD = .91) than in the
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2.5x traffic density (M = 3.31, SD = 1.20), [F(1,76) = 22.51, p = .000]. Likewise, no
interaction for supervisor assessed workload was found between procedure and traffic
density [F(1,76) = 1.53, p = .220].
III-a. Amount of coordination (experienced). After each run, controller
participants were asked to rate the amount of verbal coordination they had just
experienced. These ratings were made on a 1 to 6 scale ((Very Little (1) – Very Much
(5)). Verbal coordination entailed the discussion, negotiation or otherwise sharing of
information between controllers as to who had taken or would take action with what
planes. While the ratings varied among participants in the DCAP procedure from 1 to 4
(M = 2.23, SD = 1.05), the ratings were consistently at minimum in the DCAS procedure
(M = 1.00, SD= 0) and procedural differences in perceived amount of coordination
experienced are clearly seen in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Experienced coordination rating distributions by procedure.
Submitting these data to the analyses returned a significant main effect of
procedure with controller participants rating their experienced coordination lower in the
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DCAS procedure than in the DCAP procedure [F(1,76) = 55.50, p < .001]. This statistic
however, is only provided as a guideline as participants were ultimately invariant in their
experienced coordination ratings, and hence, the assumption of homogeneity of variance
between conditions was not met.
In regards to the factor of traffic density, the analyses did not obtain a significant
effect between the 1.7x and 2.5x levels in the amount of experienced coordination
[F(1,38) = 1.10, p = .302].
III-b. Amount of coordination (expected). After each procedure controller
participants were also asked to rate the amount of verbal coordination they expected
future controllers of NextGen to experience under either of the given procedures. These
ratings were made on the same 1 to 5 scale ((Very Little (1) – Very Much (5)) and their
frequency distributions are seen in Figure 19.

Figure 19. Expected coordination rating distributions by procedure.
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Descriptively, this plot interestingly varies from Figure 18 not only because the
ratings for DCAS stray above “1” and in one case even as high as “4”, but also because
the expected amount of coordination ratings for DCAP diverge from those of DCAS at
the right side of the chart. For their actual experienced amount of coordination,
participant ratings appear to converge on the high end of the scale but in spite of their
personal experiences in the simulation, it is interesting to note the allowance for the
possibility of greater coordination amounts in their expectations for others. Themselves
experiencing no coordination in the DCAS procedure and some in the DCAP procedure,
controller participants anticipated the possibility for some amount of coordination under
DCAS and up to very much under DCAP. Still, in general, the experienced and expected
amount of coordination measure results were more similar than dissimilar. Last, the
DCAP procedure (M = 3.70, SD = 1.16) showed higher ratings of expected coordination
amounts for future controllers of NextGen than the DCAS procedure (M = 1.60, SD =
.97), and the analyses found this difference to be significant [F(1,18) = 19.36, p = <.001].
Figure 20 illustrates this significant comparison of mean expected amount of
coordination ratings for the two procedures.
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Figure 20. Expected coordination for future significant mean comparison.
IV-a. Likability of amount of coordination (experienced). To gauge their
comfort with these levels of coordination participants were asked to rate both their
personal likability for these amounts as well as what they expected future NextGen
controllers would feel about them. By comparing Figure 21 with Figure 18, these
likability rating distributions share strikingly similar distributions and shape to the
amount of coordination experienced, enabling a nearly direct comparison. While there
were generally more ratings on the lower end of the amount of the coordination amount
scale, there were correspondingly more ratings on the favorable end of the likability
scale. Furthermore, where the experienced coordination scale spikes at “1” for its
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absence, the likability metric also invariantly follows suit in the DCAS procedure (M =
1.00, SD = .00). Overall, where the amount of coordination experienced varied in the
DCAP procedure (M = 2.37, SD = 1.15), the likability for those amounts generally
decreased in line with the more coordination was reported as experienced.

Figure 21. Agreeableness of experienced coordination amount by procedure.
Submitting these data to the analyses returned a significant main effect of
procedure with controller participants rating their experienced coordination lower in the
DCAS procedure than in the DCAP procedure [F(1,76) = 62.14, p < .001]. This statistic
however, is also only provided as a guideline as participants were again invariant in their
ratings, and so again in violation of an assumption of homogeneity of variance between
conditions. From matching the slopes of the lines in Figure 21 over those in Figure 18,
the descriptives clearly suggest a directly inverse relationship between amount and
agreeableness of coordination.
Using only the preference ratings where controllers varied in their agreeableness
of coordination responses (i.e., DCAP), the traffic density factor was analyzed and failed
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to obtain a significant effect between the 1.7x (M = 2.25, SD = 1.07) and 2.5x levels (M
= 2.56, SD = 1.15), [F(1,38) = .77, p = .387].
IV-b. Likability of amount of coordination (expected). When asked to
anticipate how agreeable controllers of NextGen would find the levels of coordination
our controllers expected they would experience, none of our controller participants
anticipated the minimum level of coordination for the DCAP procedure and likewise
none indicated that they would love that amount. On the other hand, 6 ratings expected
the minimum level of coordination for the DCAS procedure and there were 5 ratings of
“would love.” In general, as seen in Figure 22, more ratings were given on the disfavorable side of the scale for the DCAP procedure, and more were given for the DCAS
procedure on the favorable extremity.
The analyses found the average expected likability of amount of coordination rating of
the DCAS procedure (M = 1.70, SD = .82) to be more favorable than that of the DCAP
procedure (M = 3.10, SD = 088), [F(1,18) = 13.57, p <.01] (see Figure 23).

Figure 22. Coordination agreeableness expected for future controllers.
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Figure 23. Agreeableness of coordination for future significant mean comparison.
Summary – Controller Experience, Subjective
As a summary of all the subjective metrics of controller experience, large
amounts of differences are seen between the two procedures, with the DCAP procedure
producing higher ratings towards the negative ends of the scales than the DCAS
procedure both descriptively and inferentially. In regards to traffic density, controller
workload was rated significantly higher in the higher traffic density, both by the ratings
of controllers working the radar position, as well as by their supervisor’s assessment
ratings.
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V-a, V-b, V-c. Verbal coordination counts, lengths and % of run length.
Subjective amount of coordination experienced ratings by controllers were supported and
validated by the objective audio transmission data, which more clearly than anything else,
showed no recorded verbal coordination transmissions in the DCAS procedure runs
against a multitude in the DCAP procedure runs. Figure 24 presents the audio
transmission data where each colored cell (color-coded per participant that initiated the
coordination) represents one coordination transmission with the number inside the cell
equaling the duration of the transmission in seconds.

Figure 24. Verbal coordination transmissions, color coded by participant and enumerate
by length of transmission in seconds.
Ground to ground R-side verbal coordination occurred exclusively within the
DCAP runs, with an average of 7.90 (SD = 4.65) transmissions per run and each lasting
on average 10.32 seconds (SD = 3.44). When the participants did verbally coordinate, an
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average of 91.00 seconds or 10.1% (SD = .07) of a run was devoted to this coordination
task. Calculating the average amount of time each controller actually spent verbally
coordinating through the audio transmissions revealed that on average about 43.74
seconds or 4.86% of their time on position per run was spent handling ground to ground
radio coordination. Comparatively, in the DCAS runs all these numbers were nil.
For traffic density, analyses compared the average count of coordination
transmissions by run for the 1.7x density (M = 7.67, SD = 5.39) against that of the 2.5x
density (M = 8.25, SD = 4.03) but did not obtain a significant difference at the p < .05
level [F(1,8) = .03, p = .859]. The average length of coordination transmissions were
also analyzed for the 1.7x density (M = 9.20, SD = 3.75) against the 2.5x density (M =
11.99, SD = 2.44) but also did not show a significant difference at the p < .05 level
[F(1,8) = 1.68, p = .231]. Lastly as another way of looking at the coordination
transmission length data, the proportion of run time coordination transmissions took up in
the 1.7x density (M = .09, SD = .08) was analyzed against that in the 2.5x density (M =
.11, SD = .06), and likewise did not show significance at the p < .05 level [F(1,8) = .21, p
= .659].
Unexpectedly, from analyzing the audio transmission data, it was seen that one set
of four adjacent R-side controllers handled their coordination duties in a very different
way than the other set of controllers despite working identical problems under identical
conditions. As seen in Figure 24, the verbal coordination under the DCAP procedure in
runs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9 was almost entirely initiated by one single controller. Such a
technique resulted in that World transmitting less coordinations than the other World both
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in average counts, length times, and ultimately exhibiting a significant interaction of
World and procedure in the amount of time on task spent to resolve a conflict [F(1,174) =
8.12, p < .01]. On average in the DCAP procedure, controllers in World 2 resolved their
conflicts faster (M = 60.55, 36.23) than World 1 where controllers coordinated more (M
= 73.20, SD = 53.22), on the other hand in the DCAS procedure where neither World
verbally coordinated, World 2 (M = 51.28, SD = 46.31) took longer than World 1 (M =
29.61, SD = 21.24) to resolve conflicts (see Fig. 25).

Figure 25. Interaction of world and procedure on time taken to resolve a conflict.
Anecdotally, the audio coordination in World 2 (aside from being almost entirely
initiated by a single person) were characteristically almost exclusively assertive and to
the point (e.g., “AAL691, my control” or “SWA971 and UAL866, I’m taking care of.”),
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whereas the recorded verbal coordination transmissions in World 1 tended to entail a
larger proportion of more passive type coordination that sometimes opened with a
question or a negotiation (e.g., “With the DAL652, was I going to do that one or were
you?”). Examination of the factor of World across the other objective data analyses (i.e.,
Sep Violations, Time until Los, Resolution Attempts, and Heading Changes) however
failed to obtain significant main or interaction effects.
VI. Time on task taken to resolve conflicts. For each of the scripted conflicts, a
time on task metric was measured as a reflection of how fast or slow a controller resolved
a conflict under the different conditions. The start of this measurement began on the
nearest whole second when a conflict was first alerted to the R-side (i.e., when the
conflict pair appeared for the first time in the conflict table). Time was captured up until
either the controller uplinked a resolution clearance to one of the aircraft in the scripted
pair or that conflict serendipitously dropped out of the conflict table. In the event that the
same conflict pair re-appeared in the conflict table, the process was repeated and each
separate period of time that the automation declared the aircraft to be in conflict was
added together for a single data point per conflict pair per run.
The analyses showed a significantly lower average time in the DCAS procedure
(M = 40.45, SD = 37.45) than in the DCAP procedure (M = 67.58, SD = 46.63),
[F(1,170) = 20.12, p < .001] and is shown in Figure 26. The analyses however did not
obtain a significant difference in the average time taken between the 1.7x density (M =
54.50, SD = 46.46) and the 2.5x density (M = 53.24, SD = 42.26), [F(1, 170) = .02, p =
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.887]. Lastly, an unexpected interaction of procedure and world on time taken was found
and is described in the previous section with the objective coordination data.

Figure 26. Significant mean comparison of time taken to resolve a scripted conflict.
Summary – Controller Experience, Objective
To summarize the objective results characteristic of the controller experiences,
overall differences were seen between the procedures but not the traffic density.
Assumed procedural differences are apparent in the descriptive statistics of the
coordination data from the complete lack of coordination in the DCAS procedure.
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Furthermore, when just the existing coordination data (i.e., DCAP) was examined by the
factor of traffic density independently from the absences in DCAS, no significant effects
of traffic density were obtained. Correspondingly, the time on task metric did find the
controller participants to resolve conflicts faster in the DCAS procedure (i.e., where
ATCo opted out of verbal coordination for their adjacent sector conflict resolutions) than
in the DCAP procedure.
VII. Feasibility of procedure for future. In their post-procedure questionnaires,
controller participants were asked to rate each procedure separately on anticipated
feasibility for future NextGen controllers on a scale from 1 to 5 ((Entirely Feasible (1) –
Unfeasible (5)) [DCAP (M = 2.50, SD = .97), DCAS (M = 2.10, SD = .99)]. The
analyses failed to show a significant effect of the manipulation of procedure on
anticipated feasibility at the p < .05 level [F(1,18) = .83, p = .375]. Because both
response averages fell on the lower half of the scale as can be visually seen in Figure 27,
the controller participants evidently believed both the DCAS and the DCAP procedure to
be a workable set of responsibility procedures for the tested NextGen environment
without significantly differentiating between the two in terms of feasibility.
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Figure 27. Feasibility ratings by procedure.
VIII-a, VIII-b. Unnecessary plane movement (experienced, expected). In
their questionnaires controller participants were asked to rate their levels of concern for
unnecessary or counter-productive movement of planes once after each run for what they
themselves experienced and once after each procedural block as to what they anticipated
concern levels would be for future controllers of NextGen. These ratings were made on a
1 to 5 scale (Not concerned (1) – Very concerned (5)). Averages indicated generally less
concern in the DCAS (M = 1.90, SD = 1.22) than in the DCAP procedure (M = 2.23, SD
= 1.10) in the question of experienced concern as well as of that for expected concern
[DCAS (M = 2.60, SD = .97), DCAP (M = 3.40, SD = 1.27)] and the distributions for
these ratings can be seen in Figures 28 and 29.
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Figure 28. Experienced concern over the unnecessary movement of planes.

Figure 29. Expected concern for future for unnecessary movement of planes.
While both averages for the experienced concern for either procedure fell on the less
concerned side of the scale, only the DCAS procedure expected levels of concern also
indicated less rather than more concern over counter-productive plane movement. The
analyses, however, did not show a significant effect of the manipulation of procedure at
the p < .05 level on experienced concern ratings [F(1,76) = 1.67, p = .200] nor on those
anticipated for the future [F(1,18) = 2.53, p = .129]. Experienced inefficiency concerns
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were also tested between the two traffic densities but also failed to show significance
[F(1,76) = .96, p = .330] nor an interaction with procedure [F(1,76) = .12, p = .725].
Summary – Plane Performance, Subjective
Overall the subjective ratings of controllers on the plane performance level
indicated that they judged either procedure as adequate in terms of feasibility.
Furthermore, they also responded with equally low levels of concern for the efficiency of
plane movement between DCAS and DCAP, both as to what they experienced
themselves, as well as what they anticipated future controllers of NextGen to experience.
IX-a, IX-b, IX-c. Separation Violations (LoS, O.E., Proximity Event). Across
all 192 scripted conflicts presented to the participants, there were only two logged
instances of a LoS (planes came closer than 5 nautical miles horizontally and 800 feet
vertically for longer than 1 second). Under the 2.5x traffic density, one operational error
occurred in each procedure, but both were the result of a situation in which the
assumption of a timely automated detection alert was not upheld. At the present level of
development, the uncertainty associated with border-line transitioning aircraft was too
great for the automation algorithms to be able to recognize and compute resolution
trajectories in time for either experimental procedure. While not an interpretable part of
this study, these anecdotal cases are documented that they might shed light on a separate
but related research problem regarding the coordination issues with short-term conflicts.
Each of these two event series are depicted in Figures 30 and 31, for the DCAS
and DCAP procedures respectively. In both cases the underlying base scripted conflict
was set to occur between COA2985 flying eastward from ZKC 90 into ZID 81 level at an
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altitude of 40,000 ft and UPS234 flying northward through ZID 81 in a climb from
29,000 to 41,000 ft. In either procedure the conflict is detected and alerted late with only
3 minutes remaining until LoS. About half a minute after that the short term automation
issues a left turn clearance to COA2985. In that time however, the controllers (ZID 81
alone in Figure 30 and ZID 81/ZKC 90 together through a coordinate clearance in Figure
31) determine a resolution to turn UPS234 to the right. These overlapping clearances by
the automation and controllers result in the two planes turning outward away from the
initial point of predicted LoS, thus only prolonging the conflict rather than resolving it.
Lastly, the short term automation attempts to turn COA2985 behind UPS234, and while
collision is avoided, the planes are too close to avoid loss of separation minima.
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Figure 30. DCAS - Loss of separation due to late conflict detection from automation.
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Figure 31. DCAP - Loss of separation due to late conflict detection from automation.
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X. Time until LoS. Every scripted conflict began with an alert from the
automation indicating how many minutes were left until a predicted LoS would occur if
no action were taken. In the cases where a scripted pair of conflict aircraft came into
conflict multiple times with each other, averages of this time until LoS counter were
taken for that pair. Overall time until LoS represents how close in time the scripted
conflict aircraft came to losing separation. The DCAP procedure showed a slightly lower
time until LoS average (M = 7.14, SD = 1.97) than the DCAS procedure (M = 7.32, SD =
2.26), but the analyses showed no significance in this difference at the p < .05 level
[F(1,170) = .22, p = .643]. Similarly, the differences between the traffic density averages
were likewise small and in the anticipated direction of the 2.5x density have closer in
times (M = 7.14, SD = 2.23) than the 1.7x density (M = 7.32, SD = 2.01) but with no
significance [F(1,170) = .27, p = .603]. No interactive effects were found between
procedure and traffic density on the time remaining until LoS [F(1,170) = .41 , p = .523].
XI. Resolution attempts per conflict. Even with the aid of conflict-probed
automated resolution clearances, scripted conflict pairs were not guaranteed to be kept
apart indefinitely. Because of the dynamic and interactive nature of the entire traffic
environment, a pair of aircraft might conflict, be issued clearances that kept them apart,
only to then at a later time become conflicted again. That average number of resolution
attempts that a controller(s) sent for a single scripted conflict pair was highly similar
between the DCAP procedure (M = 1.31, SD = .61) and the DCAS procedure (M = 1.32,
SD = .57) and the analyses did not show attributable significance to any difference
between [F(1,170) = .01, p = .945]. The average resolution attempts per scripted conflict
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pair were also highly similar between the 1.7x density (M = 1.37, SD = .64) and the 2.5x
density (M = 1.26, SD = .53) and the analyses also did not show significant differences
between them [F(1,170) = 1.59, p = .209]. No, interactive effects were found between
procedure and traffic density on the number of resolutions sent to a scripted conflict pair
[F(1,170) = .01, p = .921].
XII. Heading change. Nearly 90% of the resolution clearances sent to scripted
conflict pairs were lateral heading changes. The angles of each of these 197 clearances
were collected as a measure of how far off a plane was moved from its present relative
heading (0°) to avoid the predicted LoS. The average magnitude of path change angle
was slightly less in the DCAS procedure (M = 25.85°, SD = 12.76°) than in the DCAP
procedure (M = 26.57°, SD = 14.63°). However, the analyses did find these differences
to be significant [F(1,185) = .28, p = .595]. In regards to traffic density, the 1.7x density
heading change average (M = 26.16°, SD = 12.52°) was highly similar to that of the 2.5x
density (M = 26.27°, SD = 14.81°) again with the analyses not yielding a significant
difference [F(1,185) = .07, p = .792]. No interactive effect was found between procedure
and traffic density on average heading change [F(1,185) = 2.02, p = .157].
Summary – Plane Performance, Objective
To summarize the objective results characteristic of the plane performance (or
service rendered to planes), overall differences were not found between the DCAS and
DCAP procedures nor between the 1.7x and 2.5x density levels. In all but two cases,
planes were kept safely apart with adequate time remaining until LoS. Furthermore,
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planes were also equivalently handled in terms of efficiency, i.e., without difference in
the number or size of clearances sent to the aircraft to keep them apart from one another.
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DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate the between-ATCo dynamic of
adjacent en-route sectors for the resolution of conflicts that span sector boundaries under
an advanced NextGen automated separation assurance environment. Under two different
anticipated future levels of air traffic density (1.7x and 2.5x), effects on controllers and
effects on planes were measured and compared between two general procedures that
differed in terms of who should be required to plan and implement deconfliction
clearances for aircraft conflicts that are predicted to lose separation in a sector beyond
where they are initially detected. Under the de-conflicting airplanes (DCAP) procedure,
the guiding rule was that aircraft ownership (as with today’s methods) underlies conflict
resolution responsibility. In such a system, for any given amount of time, a single ATCo
“owns” an aircraft and is responsible for safe-guarding it against losing separation with
other owned aircraft and at sector boundaries, works as a team with other ATCo owners
of aircraft to assure the safe transition of the aircraft. Under the de-conflicting airspace
(DCAS) procedure, the guiding rule shifts the focus from planes to an area of space
which must be kept conflict free. Where a pair of aircraft are predicted to lose separation
then dictates who ought to be planning and implementing resolutions rather than where
the aircraft presently are at the time of conflict detection.
Because the DCAS procedure reduces the number of ATCo involved in any
inter-sector conflict geometry to just one (and hence eliminates potential for temporary
ambiguity of responsibility), it was hypothesized that the procedure would show positive
advantages over DCAP in the effects it had on the experiences of the controllers.
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Furthermore, it was anticipated that this advantage would carry over to an observable
improvement in the controllers’ performance with resolution clearances that would be
safer from LoS and more efficient than in DCAP. Additionally, while either procedure
was expected to work as well in lower traffic densities, when controllers aren’t under as
much stress or strain, it was anticipated that more densely trafficked airspace would more
strongly exhibit differences between the deconfliction procedures.
Procedure Main Effects: Differences
Overall the results showed support for the first general hypothesis indicating
differences in behavior and more favorable experiences by the controllers when operating
under the DCAS procedure when compared to the DCAP procedure.
Objectively, it was seen that the controllers did not verbally coordinate their intersector resolution clearances under a procedure that did not require this of them; there
were zero recorded verbal coordination transmissions under DCAS. Notably, the
responsibility to coordinate the movement of a plane outside of their own sector with the
ATCo of the sector that presently owned the aircraft was left up to their discretion; if at
any time they felt the need to coordinate their resolutions with one another, they were
encouraged to do so. Objectively, it was also shown that the controllers were faster at
resolving their conflicts under DCAS than DCAP. Taken together, it is easy to imagine
that the presence of coordination tasks increased controllers’ time spent resolving
conflicts.
Subjectively, controllers were well aware of their behavioral differences between
the two procedures and ranked their perceived amounts of verbal coordination in line
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with their actual levels (i.e., at minimum in DCAS and as some amount in DCAP).
Importantly, in their predictions of coordination levels for future NextGen controllers,
their average ratings indicated their knowledge of the possibility of verbal coordination
under DCAS. Preference ratings for those levels of verbal coordination evidenced that
they in fact liked both amounts of coordination more than they disliked them, and that
they expected the same to be true for future controllers as well. Still, their likability
ratings (again for both actual and what they expected of others) showed a statistically
greater preference under the DCAS procedure (where coordination amount was both
objectively and subjectively less). Overall, regarding the procedures as a whole,
controllers rated their workload as lower in DCAS than DCAP and indicated greater
preference for the former over the later.
A caveat should be noted however, that there is some potential that the obtained
subjective differences in these metrics might in part be due to exceptions involving the
smooth transition of aircraft ownership/communication pairings across the sector
boundaries. Per an individual aircraft, a discrepancy between its geographic location and
ownership status (i.e., due to an errant hand-off) confuses the transparency of conflict
alerting and resolution responsibility, both for automation and controller alike, and
ultimately would have been systematically more aversive in the DCAP procedure than in
the DCAS procedure. An analysis of the exact extent to how often such exceptions did in
fact occur and might have contributed to controller’s rating of their experiences has not
yet been undertaken.
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Procedure Main Effects: Similarities
The results did not support the expectation that controllers would differentiate the
two procedures in the performance of their duties (i.e., services rendered to the planes).
In spite of reduced coordination, time on task, and workload with the DCAS procedure
(as well as greater preferences therein), controllers did not significantly differ in their
ratings of concern and feasibility for the two procedures.
Subjectively, controllers did not express concern in either procedure for
inefficient movement of planes in both their own experiences and those expected of
future controllers. Notably, it was assumed that a cost associated with a reduction in
ATCo coordination might be an increased risk of controllers working against one
another. For example, a plane might be moved for one ATCo’s purpose only to be
moved again by another ATCo for a different purpose, whereas through coordination, the
plane might have been moved but once in a way that would have achieved both purposes.
However, this perceived risk was not expressed by the participant controllers, as their
rated concerns of unnecessary or counter-productive plane movement were not
statistically different for the two procedures. Furthermore, both procedures were rated
overall as more feasible than not feasible with neither being statistically rated as more
feasible than the other.
The similarities of controller procedural performance ratings are substantiated by
apparent equivalencies in objective safety and efficiency metrics. Under either procedure
planes were in fact kept safely apart. Discounting an equivalent conflict in both
procedures where controllers and the short term automation worked against one another,
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there were no losses of separation under either procedure. Nominally, adequate amounts
of time remained before a predicted LoS might have occurred (i.e., on average greater
than seven minutes remaining per conflict) in both DCAS and DCAP. On par with the
subjective perceptions of similar efficiency under each procedure, the controllers
objectively did not in fact issue more numerous nor larger clearances in resolution of
their conflicts.
Traffic Density Main Effects: Differences and Similarities
The only place where the results showed a main effect of traffic density was on
the workload metric (both as self-rated by the controllers as well as observed by the
supervisor positions) where higher workload ratings were associated with the higher
traffic density of 2.5x over that of 1.7x. Despite this relative difference, workload rating
averages in the absolute were all well within tolerable levels. On all other metrics where
traffic density was a factor in the analysis, no statistical differences were obtained.
Interactions of Procedure and Traffic Density
No significant interactions were obtained between the procedure and traffic
density factors on any measured data. As seen from Table 3 in the results section, while
support was found to substantiate the interaction hypothesis where either DCAS or
DCAP would be both subjectively acceptable and objectively manageable under the
lower traffic density of 1.7x, results were not obtained to support the expectation that
would indicate the DCAS procedure to be exclusively manageable at the higher traffic
density level of 2.5x. Instead the only subgroup procedural average within the 2.5x data
that stands out in Table 3 (departing from its corresponding 1.7x average at greater than a
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full standard deviation and highest among its sub-groups) is the supervisor observed
workload rating of 4.00 for the 2.5x-DCAP conditions.
Lessons Learned
When initially introduced to the DCAS procedure, controller participants were
wary of the idea of planes being moved by others within their sector without the
requirement of first obtaining their direct acknowledgement. As they were reminded of
and were able to trust the notion that these movements would be actively probed for
conflicts, they seemed more interested in giving it a try. Evidently, in practice with the
present levels of automated separation assurance and the shift of focus from airplanes to
an area of airspace, controllers did take advantage of opportunities not to verbally
coordinate inter-sector resolution clearances with one another, solved the scripted
conflicts faster, with less workload, and in a more likable manner.
Interestingly, in spite of their greater positive experiences under the DCAS
procedure, participants’ ability to perform under both procedures was similar and
effective; planes were kept apart and in efficient manner. Furthermore they seemed
similarly un-phased by the increase of traffic density from the 1.7x to the 2.5x level save
for subjective workload assessments. At first, the overall results taken as a whole appear
at odds with general usability theory which assumes that user experience drives and
determines user performance. Considering the nature of this specific population of
participants (in league with that of emergency personnel like firefighters or bomb-squads
where performance can be tied directly to human life and/or immense property value),
however, it is clear how important it is for them to separate their own personal preference
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or ease of use from the ultimate performance of their critical duties. Thus, it appears that
within the presently simulated NextGen separation assurance environment, our controller
participants were able to internalize and absorb whatever differences in usability they
experienced between these manipulated procedures and traffic densities, ultimately not
letting the differences affect their work.
Limitations and Future Research
Follow-on research would look to improve upon the limitations of the present
study in at least three different general avenues. First, it would be useful to examine the
sixteen runs of training data for emergent or developed differences in experience and
performance under the different conditions. Of key interest would be whether or not their
undifferentiated performance was evident from the beginning or developed over exposure
and in what ways. For example, how long it took the controllers to accept and adapt to
each of the new operational procedures in their training runs would shed more light on
their overall comfort levels with either procedure. Second, safety and performance
differences not obtained at present might be evidenced at higher levels of traffic density
or increased complexity. In other words, a “ceiling”/“floor” effect can be recognized
from the workload ratings received where participant average ratings (although higher in
some conditions than others) were yet still all within the workload spectrum of “in the
groove” spectrum and below that of “overloaded.” It would be pertinent to determine
where, if within reason, a breaking point between the two procedures might exist,
especially in light of other obtained subjective differences of preference. Finally
providing the time and resource, a more comprehensive study would include analyzing
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all the aircraft data, extending the investigation beyond just the scripted conflict subset.
From observing the experiment as it unfolded, numerous un-scripted conflicts emerged in
the runs and it would be important to determine how representative their treatment of the
scripted conflicts was of their treatment of all the planes. While they were not given any
indication as to which were scripted and which were not, it would be important to ensure
that their measured levels of service were not drawn at the cost of those not measured.
Conclusion
While the DCAS procedure lowered controller workload, coordination, time on
task, and was more favorable for controllers in comparison with the DCAP procedure, the
levels for these aspects were still also very good for DCAP. Furthermore, in terms of the
service rendered to the planes, neither procedure departed from the other indicating that
regardless of what differences the controllers themselves experienced, they were able to
intercept these differences and prevent them from transpiring on their scopes, i.e.,
meeting their goals of safe and efficient travel. In general, because the traffic densities
represented much higher demand levels than those required today, it is very encouraging
for the ground-based automated separation assurance concept that our controller
participants were able to effectively work with each other and the automation to manage
these sector to sector conflicts under either procedure and either traffic level.
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Appendix C
Post-Run Questionnaire
Post-Run Survey
Your thoughtful feedback is a valuable part of this research. Thank you for
your participation!
R-SIDES (World?___, Station ID?___)
1. Please rate how much coordination you experienced in the last run:
1

2

3

4

Very Little

5
Very much

Rating #____
2. How agreeable/disagreeable was that amount of coordination?:
1

2

3

4

Love it

5
Hate it

Rating #____
3. How concerned are you that planes were moved un-necessarily or counterproductively?:
1

2

3

Not concerned

4

5
Very concerned

Rating #____

4. Please describe/list any aircraft that you felt behaved unusually or
unexpectedly:
84

5. Do you feel these aircraft negatively impacted your ability to perform your
duties?:

6. Please describe any problems you might have experienced with any
equipment (i.e., DSR keyboard, DSR mouse, PC keyboard, PC mouse, Headset,
Tablet PC, etc.) in the last run:

Thank you!
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Post-Procedure Questionnaire
Post-Procedure Survey
Your thoughtful feedback is a valuable part of this research. Thank you for
your
participation!
Remember
in the DCAP procedure, controllers would be responsible for any conflict in
which at least one of the conflicting aircraft was under their ownership, regardless of where
the other aircraft is and regardless of where the predicted loss of separation would occur
(i.e., could be predicted to occur in an adjacent sector).

Or
Remember in the DCAS procedure, controllers would protect an area of space from the
occurrence of predicted Losses of Separations regardless of ownership of aircraft they
would send clearances to.

(World?___, Station ID?___)
1. If the ?X? procedure were adopted as common practice, please rate how
much coordination you would expect the future NEXTGEN controllers to
experience during a typical day:
1

2

3

4

Very Little

5
Very much

Rating #____
2. How would the future NEXTGEN controllers within ?X? find that level of
coordination to be?:
1

2

3

Would Love

4

5
Would Hate
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Rating #____
3. How concerned do you think the future NEXTGEN controllers would be that
planes controlled under a ?X? procedure would be moved un-necessarily or
counter-productively?:
1

2

3

4

Not concerned

5
Very concerned

Rating #____
4. How feasible do you think a ?X? procedure might be for future NEXTGEN
controllers?:
1

2

3

4

Entirely Feasible

5
Unfeasible

Rating #____
5. Please rate your overall Situation Awareness under the ?X? procedure:
1

2

3

Very High

4

5
Very Low

Rating #____
6. Please describe any of the thoughts or opinions you have regarding the ?X?
procedure:
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Post-Study Questionnaire
Post-Simulation Questionnaire
Your thoughtful feedback is a valuable part of this research. Thank you for
your participation!

(World ?___, Station ID?___)
1. Please rate the two controller responsibility procedures for NextGen
separation assurance
based on likability from your experience with them today only:

Point of Detection* Procedure (Track Control/Ownership Based Concept; Being
responsible for conflicts involving planes under my ownership):
1

2

3

4

Love it

5
Hate it

Rating #____

Point of Conflict* Procedure (Loss of Separation Based Concept; Being
responsible only for conflicts that are predicted to occur within my area
regardless of ownership):
1

2

3

Love it

4

5
Hate it

Rating #____
88

2. If you rated one procedure higher than the others, what made you rate it
higher?

3. If you rated one configuration lower than the others, what made you rate it
lower?

4. Additional Comments?

*During the simulation the procedures were referred to as Point of Detection and
Point of Confliction but were changed to Deconflicting AirPlanes (DCAP) and
Deconflicting AirSpace (DCAS) respectively for clarification during publication.
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Appendix D
Workload Rating Scale
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